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1 Introduction and Motivation 
The economics of industrial organization or, in other words, industrial economics is an ex-
tension of microeconomics. They serve to explain markets and market processes as well as 
the strategic behavior of companies in a competitive market. The approaches of industrial 
economics are suitable for analyzing every market or industry regardless of whether these 
are classic manufacturing markets, service markets, health care markets or even media mar-
kets. Consequently, understanding media markets require command of industrial organiza-
tion economics. On the one hand, understanding markets is increasingly important because 
it is the theoretical basis for competition policy and regulatory policy. Competition policy 
sets the “rules of the game”, i.e. the rules governing market conduct, in general. Regulatory 
policy is about rules that specifically apply only to certain markets. If these policies shall 
promote social welfare, they must rest in sound industrial economics analysis. Industrial eco-
nomic know-how is important for competition authorities and for regulators but also for 
companies. The reason for this is simple: companies are active in markets and they are sub-
ject to competition law and/or regulation. If a company does not have industrial economic 
know-how, it will lead to misjudgments and wrong management decisions. On the other 
hand, understanding markets obviously benefits managerial competences in a direct way. 
Eventually, understanding the working of media markets also helps understanding commu-
nication processes in the modern world. 
The process of digitization and the increasing importance of the internet have considerably 
changed the nature of media markets. Accordingly, industrial economics has developed new 
theories and concepts to describe and analyze modern media markets. The origins of indus-
trial organization trace back to Adam Smith in the eighteenth and Alfred Marshall in the 
nineteenth century. Antoine-Augustin Cournot and Joseph Louis François Bertrand signifi-
cantly expanded their work by introducing mathematics as a method. Most modern IO-mod-
els still wear the genes of their landmark standard models. One of the pioneers of empirical 
industrial economics was Joe Staten Bain in the twentieth century (for an overview see Wald-
man & Jensen 2014). Modern industrial organization theory focuses on oligopoly theory, 
often based on game theory, institutional economics and transaction cost theory as well as 
behavioral economics. In addition, there are many econometric works as well as experi-
mental economics approaches that examine markets empirically and challenge the theories.  
Industrial economics is the basis of modern media economics. The knowledge of microeco-
nomic fundamentals is therefore indispensable for understanding modern media economics. 
On the one hand, many of its models and concepts are used in the media sector. On the 
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other hand, there have been extensions to meet the needs of the media industry.1 These 
enhancements include platform economics, the sharing economy, and the discussion of big 
data. In this contribution, essential industrial economic foundations are explained (chapter 
2). Subsequently, modern theory is discussed (chapter 3) before chapter 4 sketches some 
regulatory implications.  
 
2 Foundations of Industrial Organization 
2.1 Basic Concepts: Costs, Efficiency, and Economies 
Short-term Production Costs 
Short-term costs imply that the company has chosen its capacity and uses it to a greater or 
lesser extent. The capacity is the given operating size of a firm or company. This includes the 
production facilities, the production process, the employees, the location, the warehouses, 
the equipment with servers, etc. The capacity cannot be changed in the short-term, only in 
the long-term. The costs at different utilization levels of the capacity thus describe the short-
term cost functions.2 
The associated short-term average costs are also formed microeconomically. Accordingly, 
there are average fixed costs, average variable costs and average total costs. The average 
cost categories are calculated by dividing the fixed, variable and total costs by the output 
quantity. The course of these costs depending on the output quantity differs according to 
whether a linear or a U-shaped course of the marginal costs is assumed. The average fixed 
costs always decrease, if the produced quantity gets bigger. In terms of media economics, 
this fixed cost digression is also referred to as the “first-copy-cost-effect”. A simple example 
would be film production. We imagine, a film is shot, cut and ready to be shown. Now 
suppose that the total cost of this film are 100 m Euro. If only a single Blu Ray Disc is made 
from this film, this single Blu Ray Disc would have to bear the entire fixed costs and the 
average fixed costs would be 100 m Euro. If two Blu Rays are produced, the average fixed 
costs will drop to 50 m Euro. With three Blu Rays, the average fixed costs amount to 33.33 
m Euro, etc. Another example would be an online service. This has costs in development, 
programming, etc. However, offering the service on the internet leads to (almost) no cost at 
all. If only one service is offered, it must bear all fixed costs. 
                                                 
1 This does not mean that the “Old Industrial Economics” is (always) needless or wrong! 
2 The capacity can be underutilized, normally busy and over-loaded (up to the capacity limit). For different 
short-term cost categories and further information see Pindyck & Rubinfeld (2010) and Perloff (2001). 
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Long-term Costs 
The difference between short-term and long-term costs is that in the long term, all costs are 
variable. In other words: we intend to invest but have not done so yet. Assume we plan a 
Blu Ray press shop. So we think about how the capacity of our company should be. We can 
freely decide on the number of buildings, the offices and the production plant as well as the 
size of the warehouses and the production technology used. In our decision, we have to 
consider the prices of energy and consumables as well as the wage amount and the amount 
of interest. The idea is that we align the capacity with the planned production quantity. Only 
then can we produce cost-optimally. In the situation before the investment, we now com-
pare the existing investment and production possibilities with an assumed normal capacity 
utilization.3 
Economies of Scale and Scope 
In some markets we can see that the long-term average cost curve is L-shaped. The larger 
the capacity(!), the lower the long-term average costs. There is a point or a capacity, which 
we call “minimum optimal scale” (XMOS). Graphically, the minimum optimal scale is the point 
from which the long-run average cost curve runs horizontally. Economically, this means that 
all economies of scale have been exhausted. This means that a larger capacity than XMOS does 
not lead to a further decrease in the average cost. Two things are already clear at this point: 
First, if such an L-shaped course of the long-run average total cost exist, then there are econ-
omies of scale. Companies with a large capacity have cost advantages compared to small 
and medium-sized enterprises. Second, economies of scale are something other than a fixed 
cost degression or a “first-copy-cost-effect”! Economies of scale describe the relationship 
between capacity and cost. Economies of scale can but do not have to be in a market. The 
fixed cost degression always takes place, because it is the short-term view and quite simply 
the fixed costs are divided by the output (Koutsoyannis 1980: 106-107).4 
In addition to economies of scale, economies of scope also play a role in the media sector. 
Economies of scope exist when two or more separately producible goods can be produced 
more cheaply by one company than by two or more companies.5 In summary, there are three 
reasons for economies of scope. First, the so-called public input, i.e. the production of a 
                                                 
3 For an overview see Koutsoyannis (1980). 
4 See also Carlton & Perloff (2000), Scherer & Ross (1990), Shy (1995) and Tirole (1993). 
5 From the economies of scope the combined production is to be delimited. In combined production, the indi-
vidual goods typically cannot be produced separately. In a more or less variable ratio, therefore, at least one 
more product is produced when producing a good. A textbook example of this is the processing of crude oil 
in refineries. This always incur certain proportions of gasoline, heavy and light fuel oil, etc. The ratio is only 
slightly influenced. 
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good requires production factors that can be used for very small or marginal costs of zero 
for a second good. An example would be market knowledge that a company has acquired 
for a product, such as a journal or an online platform, and which can be used at zero mar-
ginal cost for the introduction of a second journal or another online platform. Another ex-
ample would be an editorial office that creates specific content. This created content is typ-
ically never completely used for a journal, so that the unused content could now be used at 
zero marginal cost for a second journal or recombined with other content into another jour-
nal. Second, the shared input means that the sharing of production factors leads to a lower 
consumption of resources than their use in two or more companies. A textbook example is 
a wind tunnel. If not only one car model but several are tested in the same wind tunnel, cost 
savings can be reaped compared to if several wind tunnels would be necessary for different 
models. The same applies to the publishing sector because if two magazines are written by 
two companies then two editorial offices would be necessary instead of one if the two mag-
azines are developed within the same company. The third reason for economies of scope is 
that the combined production of two or more goods can result in economies of scale being 
exploited more quickly. For example, a wind tunnel can only be created and operated cost-
optimally after a certain number of tests or testing of models. Even the optimal, minimum-
cost size of editorial staff is only reached after a certain number of magazines and newspa-
pers.6 
Economies of Density 
In addition to economies of scale and scope, economies of density can also occur in the 
media sector. Economies of density occur when average costs are lower in areas with high 
customer density than in areas with low customer density. Thus, economies of density play 
a role wherever infrastructure and networks (net industries) are needed. Examples would be 
internet connections, landline connections, mobile networks or postal deliveries. In all these 
areas, it is much cheaper to connect or reach a certain number of people in a densely popu-
lated area than in sparsely populated areas. In extreme cases, with one kilometer of fiber-
optic cable in a large city with a high population density, thousands of consumers can be 
reached, while in rural areas only very few consumers are supplied per kilometer. When 
economies of density exist, they have a significant impact on business incentives and behav-
iors. First of all, there is an incentive to enter the market where a potentially high number of 
customers are reached at low cost. This means, for example, that the rural regions are con-
                                                 
6 For an overview see Carlton & Perloff (2000), Scherer & Ross (1990), Shy (1995) and Tirole (1993). 
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nected much later which is precisely what can be observed in fiber-optic cable network ex-
pansion in Germany. At the same time, there would be regional price differentiation. In the 
densely populated areas, an internet connection would be much cheaper for the customer, 
because the connection costs are considerably lower. In the countryside, a connection of the 
same quality would cost considerably more (for overviews and further details see Belle-
flamme & Peitz 2015; Carlton & Perloff 2000; Scherer & Ross 1990; Shy 1995; Tirole 1993). 
Sunk Costs 
Another important cost concept is sunk costs. Sunk costs include the part of the fixed costs 
that cannot be recaptured when firms leave a market or represents the difference between 
the acquisition value for the planned and the value in the next best use. A good example of 
sunk costs is advertising expenditure. If a company advertises a product and this product 
flops, all advertising expenses are irretrievably lost. By contrast, if a company invests in an 
office building and is subsequently forced out of the market, the office building can be sold 
and not all fixed costs are irretrievably lost. Sunk costs are the higher the more specialized 
an investment good is, because the value of a very special capital asset in an alternative use 
is very low. Furthermore, sunk costs have the property that they are unavoidable after the 
investment, i.e. parts of the fixed costs are irretrievably lost. Sunk costs also found market 
entry and market exit barriers. The logic here is that investments with high sunk costs have 
a high risk and therefore companies refrain from investing or are not leaving the market due 
to sunk costs (for overviews and further details see Belleflamme & Peitz 2015; Carlton & 
Perloff 2000; Scherer & Ross 1990; Shy 1995; Tirole 1993). 
Transaction Costs 
Since the landmark essay by Ronald Harry Coase “The nature of the firm” in 1937 another 
cost category became relevant, namely transaction costs. Transaction cost theory deals with 
question why there are companies at all when, principally, every worker in a market economy 
could be self-responsible, self-employed, and exchange the results of his production on spe-
cialized markets. However, essentially, companies coordinate individual activities and, thus, 
according to Kenneth Joseph Arrow 1969, represent "islands of hierarchical coordination" in 
the market system (see also Arrow 1991). In a simple definition, a transaction takes place 
when a good is transmitted via a technically separable interface. Transaction costs can there-
fore be defined as the costs of coordinating transactions between economic entities. Trans-
action cost theory analyzes the factors determining the level of transaction costs when using 
alternative coordination methods. Internally, companies coordinate the activities of employ-
ees hierarchically and decide on the market behavior in the external relationship, and take 
advantage of the opportunities and risks arising from the company's economic activities in 
 6 
the markets. Employees work in the company under hierarchical management and for a 
(more or less) fixed, non-performance-related remuneration. From the company's point of 
view, it is therefore relevant to examine whether, for instance, an upstream stage of the 
supply-chain should be integrated into the company or whether the respective good should 
be purchased via the market (make-or-buy decision). In principle, this is the answer to the 
question whether a hierarchical or a market-based coordination should take place. Depend-
ing on whether transaction costs in the hierarchical are higher or lower than in the market 
coordination, one of the two forms of coordination is preferable (Williamson 1985). 
 
2.2 Types of Markets and Barriers to Entry and Exit 
Introduction 
In economics, the term market refers to a (virtual) place where supply and demand meet. Its 
main characteristic is the decentralized, self-organized coordination of supply and demand 
via the process of competition. Price signals set incentives for individual suppliers and cus-
tomers to adjust their individual production and consumption plans in a way that market 
supply and market demand move towards each other in terms of quantities (coordination). 
Without the self-organizing force of market competition, supply and demand run a high risk 
of permanently diverging with an increasing divide. In its model theory representation, this 
process of coordination ends up in equilibrium because changes of the framework and en-
vironmental conditions are ignored (in order to theoretically isolate the coordination mech-
anism). In reality, these framework and environmental conditions, however, change perma-
nently, i.e. cost changes, changes of tastes and preferences, changing trade conditions, de-
veloping knowledge and technologies, etc. These changes represent a diverging force on 
market supply and demand, whereas market competition represents a coordinating force 
amid the inherent dynamics of the economy. In other words, permanently new coordination 
needs are created and, thus, the coordinating market process is permanent. So far, no cen-
tralized, public mechanisms have been found or developed that are able to cope with this 
coordination task.7 
If a market is hypothetically reduced to its inherent coordination mechanism, i.e. it is as-
sumed, inter alia, that (i) there are no changes of the environment and framework condi-
tions, (ii) the number of suppliers and customers is so high that no single supplier or buyer 
                                                 
7 According to Friedrich August von Hayek (1945, 1968), it is impossible to replace the decentralized and self-
organizing competitive market process by any centralized and administrative mechanism. So far, empirical 
evidence has fully supported his assessment. 
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can influence the market price, (iii) perfect information, and (iv) a homogenous good is 
traded, then we call this the basic model of a homogenous polypoly or “perfect” competi-
tion. This type of market is relevant for analytical purposes; however, it hardly exists in reality. 
Oligopoly Theory 
Most real-world markets can adequately be described as belonging to the oligopoly types of 
markets. Oligopoly models tackle another important feature of competitive markets, namely 
the strategic interdependence among suppliers (and among customers as well). The success 
of any employed strategy in competition depends (i) on the smartness of your strategy, but 
(ii) also on the reactions of your competitors to your strategy. A price decrease may yield an 
increasing demand – but not so if your competitors decrease their prices even further. A 
smart innovation may successfully draw new demand – but not so if the innovation of your 
competitors is even smarter. It is like in parlor games: the quality of a move (in terms of 
success) depends both on the ingenuity of the move itself and on the brilliancy of the reac-
tions of the other players. Not accidentally, the branch of mathematics analyzing such phe-
nomena of strategic interdependency is called game theory. Consequently, companies acting 
on competitive markets face two restrictions to their strategic behavior: (i) (as always) the 
reactions of the customers and (ii) the reactions and actions of the competitors. 
Thus, proper competitive processes take place in oligopolistic markets where suppliers com-
pete via various strategies like, for instance, pricing, product and service design, product 
differentiation, innovation on goods and technologies, etc. Consequently, this type of mar-
kets is extremely multifaceted. Correspondingly, industrial economics has developed numer-
ous models analyzing oligopolistic competition. For the purpose of empirical market analysis, 
these models may be tailormade to the specifics of a given market and calibrated by real-
world data (for an overview see Budzinski & Ruhmer 2010.).8 
A very important distinction relates to the difference between homogenous and heteroge-
neous goods. The term goods includes both products and services as well as immaterial 
versions of those like, for instance, digital goods or intellectual property rights. Homogenous 
goods are identical in the eyes of the customer, i.e. customers have no preferences from 
which supplier they buy the good. Next to the “objective”, technical features of the good 
being identical, homogeneity also include the absence of more “subjective” features like 
brands, design, supplier reputation, etc. The latter is the reason why homogenous goods are 
rarely found on markets where consumers are the buyers because they usually have prefer-
                                                 
8 For instance, with the help of econometric methods or simulations. 
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ences for such things. On business-to-business markets, homogenous goods exist particu-
larly for raw materials and standardized compounds. Whenever customers have preferences 
about suppliers, heterogeneous goods are present. Quantity (Cournot) competition can of-
ten be found in markets with few suppliers and relatively homogenous goods, whereas price 
(Bertrand) competition is particularly relevant for markets with heterogeneous goods. While 
Cournot-oligopolies tend towards low competition intensity and collusion (cartels, coordi-
nated effects, tacit collusion, etc.), heterogeneous Bertrand-oligopolies represent the empir-
ically most relevant environment for various competition strategies of enterprises. It thus has 
become the most important theoretical framework in industrial organization during the last 
three decades.9 
Monopoly 
If there is only one supplier present on a market, then this type of market is called monopoly. 
Within competitive processes, temporary monopolies may emerge if disruptive innovations 
create new markets with the innovator being the monopolist. However, competitors imitat-
ing the innovation will soon recreate competition in such markets. A second market-internal 
monopoly may follow platform and network effects, which will be addressed in section 2.3. 
Generally, the probability of permanent market-immanent monopolies decrease with the 
size of the market and, particularly, the heterogeneity and diversity of goods traded on that 
market. The vast majority of the monopolies existing in the real-world are protected against 
competition by some form of public regulation (monopoly privilege). A monopolist faces 
only one of the two usual restrictions to its strategic behavior: while he still needs to consider 
the reaction of the customers (who may stop buying the good), the competitor restriction is 
not apparent anymore. Persistent monopolies harm welfare because of (i) an efficient allo-
cation (higher prices accompanying lower quantities), (ii) a considerable decrease in innova-
tion dynamics, and (iii) an exploitation of customers (to the gain of the monopolist at the 
expense of social welfare). 
While long-run pure monopolies are rare and usually the result of and protected by govern-
mental intervention, quasi-monopolies represent a more frequent phenomenon. These are 
markets where one company is so much bigger than the others that it enjoys almost mo-
nopoly-like market power. 
 
                                                 
9 Textbooks often additionally refer to the case of Bertrand competition with homogenous goods and without 
capacity constraints because in this specific case the oligopoly resembles the results of the polypoly („perfect“ 
competition) model. However, this specific case rarely surfaces in reality and its results do not hold for the 
much more complex world of heterogeneous Bertrand-oligopolies. 
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Contestability and Barriers to Entry 
The contestability of different markets varies according to the presence of barriers to entry 
and exit. In the present literature (originally pioneered by Joe S. Bain), the division into state, 
structural and strategic barriers to entry is predominant. State (or institutional) barriers to 
market entry arise through administrative market access regulations. Examples would be taxi 
licenses, patents, vocational training to be completed, etc. Structural barriers to entry stem 
from the nature of the market (for example, economies of scale, investment requirements, 
advantages from experience and learning, etc.). Strategic barriers are created by established 
companies on the basis of structural or state barriers to market entry. The established com-
panies are therefore making strategic use of the structural and state barriers to market entry. 
These include strategies such as raising rivals costs, strategic overcapacity, strategic patent 
policies, artificial creation of incompatibilities and switching costs, excessive brand building, 
etc. (for overviews and further details see Belleflamme & Peitz 2015; Carlton & Perloff 2000; 
Scherer & Ross 1990; Shy 1995; Tirole 1993.) 
Barriers to entry protect the insiders who are already in the market (incumbents) from new 
competition by outsiders entering the market (newcomers). This may be crucial to turn a 
temporary monopoly (for instance, due to disruptive innovation) into a persistent one be-
cause it prevents imitation competition. Institutional barriers to entry are often prohibitive 
in the sense that they cannot be overcome (already determined by law) and harm contesta-
bility more severely than structural and strategic barriers. Similarly, barriers to entry may 
allow a dominant company in a quasi-monopoly to preserve and protect its market power 
(and increase the cope for abusing it). In oligopolies, barriers to entry do not completely 
prevent competition but they do reduce competition intensity in the market because incum-
bents only compete with each other and do have to face maverick newcomers. Barriers to 
exit are relevant as well because leaving a market is costly (for instance, due to sunk costs), 
this will negatively affect the decision to enter it. 
In former times, relevant entry barriers to media markets included the scarcity of frequencies, 
naturally limiting the number of broadcasting channels (radio and television programs), or 
the necessary to have access to the cable network of telecommunications or television. 
Thanks to digitization, mobile technology and the internet, these structural barriers to entry 
have virtually vanished. A relevant entry barrier regarding the provision of media contents 
was always seen in the selecting function of publishers and editorial offices who decided 
about the program contents and, thus, determined among which options consumers could 
choose. The ubiquitous availability of online services renders this barrier to entry ineffective 
as well as virtually everyone can now offer their contents easily through the internet. 
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However, does this imply that there are no barriers to entry in modern media markets? Two 
examples demonstrate that it is not that easy. First, the problem of information overflow 
implies that access to audience attention is crucial for the commercial success of online con-
tents (Falkinger 2008; Budzinski & Gaenssle 2018). The numbers of uploaded content by far 
exceeds what users (consumers) can survey in order to make an informed consumption de-
cision. Instead, they need someone to preselect the content options. On the internet, this is 
partly done by promotion or multichannel networks that basically take over the role of the 
former editorial offices in selecting what is brought to the attention of the user and what 
not. Interacting with these promotion networks are individualized search and recommenda-
tion algorithms of relevant platforms (like YouTube, Netflix, etc.). Empirical research confirms 
that most users limit their choice of contents to the items listed on the first page of their 
recommendation list. These algorithms usually aim to combine two goals: (i) bringing con-
tent to the user that satisfies her individual preferences (based on the users’ consumption 
history10) and (ii) increase the consumption of the network so to maximize the platforms’ 
revenues. While the exact working properties of the algorithms are business secret and 
changed quite frequently, smart promotion network managers excel in guessing the under-
lying mechanisms correctly and managing to push their contents (artists, videos, songs, mov-
ies, etc.) up on the recommendation lists, so that they receive the attention of more users 
(Budzinski & Gaenssle 2018). Without such professional help, it is getting increasingly more 
difficult to effectively “enter” online markets in the sense that your content is even perceived 
by a relevant number of users (structural barrier to entry).  
Secondly, on modern media markets, switching costs and lock-in effects gain importance as 
relevant entry barriers (Burnham et al. 2003). For instance, the running time of an internet 
access contract or a mobile phone contract prevents switching to another provider during 
the contract period. Due to habituation effects, customers may have become accustomed to 
Apple products and therefore always opt for an Apple product when purchasing new (lock-
in). In particular companies with market power experience incentives to artificially increase 
switching costs and create incompatibilities with competitors in order to lock-in their con-
sumers. For instance, while it is common that telephone calls are interconnected irrespective 
of the provider, it is not possible to use Facebook’s messengers and social networks (includ-
ing subsidiaries like WhatsApp) to communicate with consumers using different apps and 
networks. Obviously, it would be no problem to allow for this from a technological point of 
                                                 
10 See section 3.3 for more details on data-based business models. 
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view but Facebook may lock-in its users by blocking compatibility here (strategic barrier to 
entry). 
 
2.3 Market Failure 
Introduction 
A market failure exists when a market does not come to fruition or when market competition 
leads to inefficient results. The term “failure” may be somewhat misleading since such mar-
kets often “just” work imperfectly but still work – and often better so than alternative re-
gimes. If there is a market failure, government intervention can be considered. However, 
while regulation may improve the working of the market in these cases, there is no guarantee 
that it does so in reality (inefficiencies of political decision processes including lobbyism as 
well as bureaucratic and administrative deficiencies may well mean that the regulated mar-
ket performs even worse than the “failed” market). Government intervention should, there-
fore, be as mild and reluctant as possible, so as to distort competition as little as possible. 
Note that if a market that is already under regulation and/or government intervention per-
forms badly, then this may be regulation failure rather than market failure. There are four 
reasons in the literature that lead to market failure. 
Natural Monopoly 
Economies of scale may create a natural monopoly. A natural monopoly exists when the 
demand curve of a homogenous market intersects the long run average total cost curve in 
the falling range (sufficient condition) or subadditivity exists given the demand and cost 
structure of the homogenous market (necessary condition) (for overviews and further details 
see Belleflamme & Peitz 2015; Carlton & Perloff 2000; Scherer & Ross 1990; Shy 1995; Tirole 
1993). 
Subadditivity exists when the production of the requested quantity of a homogenous good 
in one company causes lower total costs than the production of the same quantity in two or 
more companies. In the case of a multiple product, the same applies. Natural monopolies 
are virtually always industries bound to pipe or cable networks (water pipe network, energy 
cable network, etc.), for which no sufficiently close substitutes exist. The telephone cable net 
used to be a natural monopoly, however, with the emergence of mobile and internet teleph-
ony, today this may not be true anymore. 
It also becomes clear from these remarks that there is typically no subaddivity at the service 
level. That is, the digital economy is usually not a natural monopoly because neither the 
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sufficient nor the necessary condition is met11, i.e. Google, Facebook, Ebay or Amazon are 
not natural monopolies. They may enjoy some kind of quasi-monopoly positions, however, 
they do not represent a natural monopoly in the industrial-economic sense. Naturally, a 
fixed-cost degression is observable: The more users use a service, the lower the average fixed 
costs. The same is true for digital goods like e-books, music streams, online videos, etc. While 
they are characterized by a strong first-copy-cost-effect (strong fixed-cost digression), they 
do not constitute natural monopolies because they represent heterogeneous goods. The rel-
evant markets are heterogeneous markets consisting of many e-books (e.g. of a specific 
genre), many music streams or many online videos, respectively.  
External Effects 
An external effect (or externality) occurs when an actor's utility or profit function contains, 
apart from its own action parameters, at least one variable that is not (fully) controlled by 
her but by one (or more) other actors. There is a direct relationship between utility or profit 
functions of multiple actors. An external (technological) effect can be negative or positive. 
The benefit or the profit increases or decreases. The external effect is not captured by the 
market mechanism, i.e. there is no compensation over the price. Examples for a negative 
external effect would be noise and exhaust fumes, which lead to illnesses. Or noisy party 
music that robs the neighbor of sleep (negative). A positive external effect may be a beauti-
fully painted garage that the neighbors enjoy every day. One and the same event may cause 
negative and positive externalities at the same time. An open-air AC/DC concert that can be 
heard outside the stadium will be negative for classical music lovers, but positive for hard-
rock fans. This kind of external effects can be responsible for a market failure. 
What causes market failure when technological externalities occur? In principle, too much 
or too little of a good may be produced because the external effect is not reflected in prices 
and costs. Potential solutions are the so-called internalization of external effects. The external 
effects are to be mapped via the market mechanism. For this it is necessary to define property 
rights. In extreme cases, internalization through government intervention may be useful (e.g. 
prohibitions, taxes, subsidies, state provision of goods, certificates, etc.). Note that small or 
minor externalities reduce the efficiency of a market only very marginally and do not require 
(costly) regulatory intervention (for overviews and further details see Belleflamme & Peitz 
2015; Carlton & Perloff 2000; Scherer & Ross 1990; Shy 1995; Tirole 1993.). 
 
                                                 
11 There is a fixed-cost digression but no subadditivity! 
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Public Good 
A public good fulfills two criteria, namely non-rivalry in consumption and non-excludability. 
A private good, on the other hand, is characterized by rivalry in consumption and excluda-
bility. For instance, only one person can consume the contents of the bottle of an energy 
drink (rivalry). Excludability is based on the price: someone who is not willing to pay for a 
bottle of this energy drink, cannot get one. In contrast, a classic textbook example of a public 
good is a lighthouse. There is non-rivalry in consumption because the lighthouse does not 
get better or worse or even disappears when one boat or 1,000 boats use the lighthouse to 
navigate. There is also non-exclusion from consumption, because it is impossible to let the 
light shine for one boat but not for an (close-by) other. 
It is difficult to identify public goods in the media industry. The frequently (mis-)used exam-
ple of public broadcasters does not represent a public good in the economic sense. The first 
criterion, non-rivalry in consumption, is fulfilled: an increasing audience does not harm or 
benefit the consumption of any single viewer. However, the second criterion, non-excluda-
bility, is not given nowadays: it is technologically rather uncomplicated to encode broad-
casting signals and provide decoders for paying customers only. Pay TV represents a relevant 
example. In contrast to Pay TV, public service broadcasters usually deliberately relinquish 
from encoding their broadcasts as often does advertised-financed commercial TV. However, 
the economic public good concept refers to the fundamental characteristics of a good – 
irrespective of political or social purposes or commercial business models. Therefore, neither 
free broadcasting for social purposes (public service broadcasters), nor for commercial con-
siderations (advertised-financed “free” TV or internet content)12 constitutes a public good if 
excludability was technologically and organizationally easily possible – as it is the case here. 
If there is a public good, then a financing problem can arise. This is due to the free-rider 
problem, which implies that everyone wants to be in the user collective but not in the cost 
collective. Due to the non-excludability, non-payers cannot be excluded from using the good; 
therefore, everyone has an incentive to use the good without payment – resulting in an 
under-provision of the good. In this case, alternative financing options must be considered 
(for overviews and further details see Belleflamme & Peitz 2015; Carlton & Perloff 2000; 
Scherer & Ross 1990; Shy 1995; Tirole 1993). 
 
 
                                                 
12 For the logic of business models offering content for „free“ see section 3. 
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Asymmetric Information 
Asymmetric information exists when players on one market side are less well informed re-
garding market-relevant aspects than market players on the other side of the market and 
the players on the better informed market side can strategically use their information ad-
vantage to their benefit. Thus, both the demand side and the provider side can be less well 
informed. A lack of market-relevant information can occur in a quantitative sense, i.e. some 
information is not known on one market side, or in a qualitative sense, i.e. information on 
one market side is poor (e.g. false, misleading, or misinterpreted). Asymmetric information 
often occurs when goods display elements of experience and credence goods. In the case of 
experience goods, the consumer can assess the quality of the good only after consumption13, 
in the case of credence goods not even then. Most media contents are experience goods, for 
instance, a viewer will only know after watching a movie or a video how good it was. News 
may even include credence good character because the recipient may not be able to check 
their trustworthiness. In order for asymmetric information to become a market failure prob-
lem, it is necessary that the supplier is better informed. In the case of news-type media con-
tent, this will usually be the case. However, despite its experience good character, there is 
often no information asymmetry with respect to entertainment goods. The supplier does not 
know either whether a movie or a video will suit the preferences of the viewers (otherwise 
there would only be commercial successes and no failures in these markets). Whether a 
viewer finds a comedy video funny is ex ante unknown both to the producer and the con-
sumer – so there is lack of information but no asymmetry that can be strategically exploited. 
Information asymmetry may lead to market failure if its strategic exploitation by the better 
informed market side leads to adverse selection as elaborated by George A. Akerlof in his 
famous essay of 1970, "The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism" (also Darby & Karni 1973). He describes why on the American used car market of the 
1950s, only bad and no good cars were traded. The reason for this is imperfect information 
before the transaction: the buyers cannot assess the quality of the car ex ante (experience 
and/or credence good character). For simplification, George A. Akerlof assumes that there 
are two types of cars of the same type offered, namely "bad" (lemons, considerable short-
comings) and "good" (plums, no shortcomings). The quality of the cars cannot be determined 
by the potential buyers before the transaction (due to hidden information or hidden charac-
teristics). In contrast, the seller knows the quality of the car, however, the sellers of bad cars 
                                                 
13 Note that experience good elements do not matter much if the good is bought in a high frequency by the 
consumer, because then only the first buy really has experience character. Daily products or food represent 
examples. 
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experience no incentive to reveal their superior knowledge about the bad state of their cars. 
The proportion of good and bad vehicles is the same (50 per cent). Buyers are willing to pay 
$ 2,400 for a good car and $ 1,200 for a bad car. Sellers want $ 2,000 for a good car and $ 
1,000 for a bad car, so that mutually beneficial transactions are possible in both market 
segments. 
What are rational buyers under these conditions willing to pay given their lack of knowledge 
about the quality of the vehicles (asymmetric information to the detriment of buyers) and 
the probability of catching a good vehicle being 0.5? Or more simply, what is the market 
price? Rational buyers are willing to pay (at maximum) the expected value, based upon the 
probability to accidentally catch a good or a bad vehicle, which is as follows: 0.5 x 2.400 + 
0.5 x 1.200 = $ 1.800 (under the assumption of risk-neutrality). So what is the result? No 
good cars ("plums") are sold because the market price ($ 1,800) is below the required price 
of the supplier ($ 2,000). Only bad cars ("lemons") are sold because the market price ($ 1,800) 
is above the required price of the provider ($ 1,000). The market for good cars collapses or 
does not even happen and only bad cars are traded. This adverse selection, thus, leads to 
market failure. A media example could be a market for news-type contents where cheap but 
low quality (maybe sensationalist or even fake) news prevail whereas expensive, high-quality 
news do not find sufficient recipients because the recipients cannot identify the high quality 
offers with sufficient certainty.  
A similar example of market failure would be an insurance market. Here, the asymmetric 
information is to the detriment of the provider because he cannot know how the insurant 
behaves after conclusion of the contract. The consequence of having a bicycle insurance, for 
instance, may reduce the efforts and incentives of the insurant to protect her bike against 
damage and theft. This increases the frequency of damages and, subsequently, the insurance 
price. As a result, having a bicycle insurance does not pay-off anymore for individuals taking 
good care of their bike because insurance prices are very high whereas their individual prob-
ability of damage is low. Thus, these so-called good risks are leaving the insurance while only 
the bad risks are left (moral risk, hidden action, self-selection). The market may collapse or 
may not even materialize. This so-called moral hazard leads to market failure. 
Problems of asymmetric information usually can be alleviated market-internally via screening 
and signaling. Screening means that players on the less informed market side improves their 
level of information through self-information or specialized third parties. Consumers of news 
media content can, for instance, use and compare multiple sources or search for additional 
information. Furthermore, assessments and experience reports by other consumers like rat-
ings, comments, and reviews may be of help. Similarly, opinions of experts and peers can be 
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consulted. Signaling means that the better informed market side provides information. This 
can be done through reputation-building, guarantees, provision of external or independent 
expertise, offering deductibles or no-claims discount. In the case of news contents, invest-
ment – for instance in a net of reporters and correspondents all around the world – can be 
a quality signal as well. Note that in particular high quality suppliers experience strong in-
centives to invest in signaling in order to establish and keep alive their market segment. If 
all these instruments are not sufficient to reduce the exploited asymmetric information, then 
public regulation may be considered (for overviews and further details see Hirshleifer 1973; 
Belleflamme & Peitz 2015; Carlton & Perloff 2000; Scherer & Ross 1990; Shy 1995; Tirole 
1993). 
 
3 Modern Economic Theory of the Digital Economy 
3.1 Platform Economics 
Introduction 
During the 2000s, the theory of industrial organization was enriched by a new body of the-
ory, which since then has become popular for media economics analyses, in particular re-
garding online media as well as digital goods (Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006). Originating 
from the analysis of markets for payment systems like credit cards, the theory started under 
the label two-sided markets (pioneered14 by Rochet & Tirole 2002, 2003, 2006; Armstrong 
2006; Evans & Schmalensee 2007, 2015; see also Haucap & Stühmeier 2016). In the course 
of time, however, the more general and less misleading15 term platform economics has es-
tablished itself. 
A platform is a supplier of goods (products or services) to two or more customer groups 
characterized by three constitutional characteristics: 
(1) The customer groups are distinct (distinguishable and delimitable from each other), 
(2) The customer groups are indirectly connected with each other via indirect network 
effects (INE). 
(3) These INE cannot or only to a limited extent be internalised by the customer groups 
because transaction costs prevent or hamper side-payments and arbitrage. 
                                                 
14 An important predecessor is Demange & Gale (1985). 
15 The term two-sided markets – referring to two demand sides of the market – may be misleading because 
every market actually has two sides – supply and demand. Furthermore, there may be markets with three or 
more demand sides (multi-sided markets). 
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In the original case of payment systems (like credit cards) the supplier of the payment system 
sells its service to the customer group (i) consumers, using it for payment in shops, and (ii) 
shop owners, accepting it from consumers.  
Network Effects 
The crux of platform economics is the INE between the two customer groups. Direct network 
effects (DNE) describe the case where an increasing number of network members increases 
the individual utility for network users, both incumbents and newcomers (Farrell & Saloner 
1985; Katz & Shapiro 1985). Social media networks (like Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.) 
represent an example: if more of your friends are joining the network, the utility derived 
from the network services (communicating, social interacting, etc.) for yourself and for each 
of your friends increases. While DNE, thus, work within the same customer group, INE work 
in a similar way but between distinct customer groups. Consumers, for instance, derive a 
higher utility from holding and using a payment system (a certain credit card, for instance) 
if they can pay with it in many shops. Consequently, if more shop owners (customer group 
ii) decide to accept the payment system, the utility of consumers (customer group i) increases 
– and so does their demand of the payment system. This is a positive INE (increasing partic-
ipation of customer group (ii) leads to an increasing participation of customer group (i)). 
And in the case of payment systems the positive INE runs in both directions: shop owners 
find it more interesting to accept a given payment system if many consumers are willing to 
pay with it. Thus, an increasing participation of customer group (i) also increases demand by 
customer group (ii). 
The platform needs to manage the two (or more) demand sides like a chicken-egg-problem 
(Caillaud & Jullien 2003): it needs to attract sufficient numbers from both customer groups 
in order to get the service running. If the INE between the customer groups are not equally 
strong in each direction (which is empirically the usual case), then the platform faces incen-
tives to attract especially those customers whose group exert the stronger positive INE on 
the other customer group. If, for instance, boys strongly focus on going to clubs where many 
girls are, whereas girls see the presence of many boys as a less relevant criterion for going 
into a club (but still a positive one), then the club owner acts fully rational if she concentrates 
on attracting girls (free entry, bonus drinks, atmosphere, music selection, etc.) and expects 
boys to join automatically if successful. This involves an important implication of platform 
economics: the price structure may be asymmetric in the sense that the customer group 
exerting the stronger INE will be priced very low (up to zero or even with negative prices) 
whereas the other customer group is priced so high that it covers the costs of serving the 
first group as well. If girls get free entry plus bonus drinks in a club (a negative price!), then 
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boys entrance fee plus consumption must cover these costs as well. This asymmetric price 
structure considerably differs from pricing on “ordinary” markets. Commonly, the literature 
distinguishes transaction platforms from non-transaction platforms. In the first case, trans-
actions between the distinct customer groups are directly consummated via the platform or 
at least directly observable for the platform. Non-transaction platforms require a platform-
external transaction after the mutual attention for the transaction partner has been created 
by the platform. 
INE may also be one-sided or even negative, which is often the case in platform media mar-
kets. A prime example are content providers on the internet who offer their content for free 
(a price of zero) and finance themselves through advertising revenues (predominantly non-
transaction platforms like, for instance, online newspapers and magazines, social networks, 
search engine services, price comparison services, audio and video streaming services, etc.). 
Here, the distinct customer groups are (i) users of the content and (ii) advertisers buying 
advertising space from the platform. The INE from users to advertisers is positive: if more 
users are visiting the content provider’s website, then advertisers find it more attractive to 
place their advertising. However, the other way around, the direction of the INE is not so 
clear. Actually, many users may find the advertising disturbing and constituting a disutility. 
If this is the case, then the INE from advertisers to users is negative: more advertising will 
reduce demand by users. Similar examples are advertising-financed television or partly ad-
vertising-financed printed newspapers and magazines. Logically, the platform will focus on 
attracting the customer group exerting the positive INE by subsidizing it (free content) and 
by trying to design its service in a way that the advertising is both as effective as possible 
(increasing the willingness-to-pay of advertisers) and as little disturbing as possible (increas-
ing participation of users, which in turn also increases the advertisers’ willingness to pay due 
to better reach). This has fueled many innovations in advertising placing and design (search 
advertising, sophisticated types of targeted advertising, influencer marketing as a new form 
of product placement, native advertising, etc.) as well as in advertising pricing models (pay-
per-view, pay-per-click, etc.). 
Platform Competition 
The importance of platform economics for modern media economics is also related to the 
explanation of the phenomenon that some digital/online markets are characterized by dom-
inating, almost monopoly-like platforms while others are not. Modern platform economics 
has clearly developed that while monopolies are more efficient on platform markets than on 
“ordinary” markets (due to the internalization of INEs), still competition among platforms is 
better for welfare, in particular in the medium- and long-term. Industrial organization theory 
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is analyzing the features of platform markets in regard to their effect on competition among 
versus monopoly of platforms (Evans & Schmalensee 2007; Haucap & Heimeshoff 2014; Hau-
cap & Stühmeier 2016). This research is still ongoing but the following factors have already 
been identified to promote sustainable platform competition (and their opposite to promote 
dominant positions of single platforms): 
- weak and/or asymmetric INE, 
- weak DNE, 
- multi-homing by customer groups, i.e. customers regularly using more than one plat-
form, 
- size of the market, i.e. the larger the market, the more platforms may be able to 
attract a sufficient number of customers of each group, 
- heterogeneity of customer preferences, i.e. if the needs of customers differ within 
the customer groups, different platforms may specialize on different needs (like Fa-
cebook on private social interacting, LinkedIn and Xing on business social interacting, 
Snapchat on very young users, etc.), 
- (accompanying) heterogeneity of platform services, 
- compatibility among platforms, i.e. interconnectivity of users of different platforms 
and low switching costs, 
- innovation dynamics, 
- etc. 
Different platform markets will meet these factors in different ways, thus, being more or less 
prone to being dominated by a single platform. However, once platforms enjoy market 
power, they can also strategically shape the platform market conditions in anticompetitive 
ways, for instance, by deliberately creating incompatibilities and switching costs, standard-
izing platform services, encouraging single-homing, reinforcing positive DNEs and INEs, and 
many more.  
The issue of welfare also relates to the distinction between natural and artificial platforms. 
Natural platforms describe markets where transactions are impossible without the interme-
diary service of a platform (= transaction costs are prohibitive with the platform service), 
whereas artificial platforms describes markets which could be organized in an “ordinary” 
way but where companies strategically chose to turn its business into a platform. Payment 
systems are an example of natural platforms, whereas online shops are an example of artifi-
cial platforms. An online shop can organize itself as an “ordinary” retailer, i.e. buying goods 
from producers or wholesalers and resell the goods to consumers. Note that this is part of a 
vertical supply chain and does not constitute a platform! Alternatively, however, an online 
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shop can organize itself as a platform offering other shops, producers, and wholesalers vir-
tual shop space on its platform and focus on bringing sellers and buyers together as a match-
ing service, perhaps accompanied with transactions services (like payment services, customer 
complaint services, search and recommendation services, rating services, etc.). The online 
shopping giant Amazon, for instance, once started as an “ordinary” retailer and still runs a 
considerable part of its business like this. Later on, it added a shopping platform (“Amazon 
Marketplace”), where it turned part of its retailing business into a platform business 
(Budzinski & Köhler 2015). The distinction between natural and artificial platforms is partic-
ularly relevant if platforms tend towards monopolistic positions: in the case of a natural 
platform, the quasi-monopoly may be acceptable for society due to the otherwise impossible 
internalization of INE, whereas in the case of an artificial platform, it represents a deliberate 
monopolization strategy not determined by the nature of the market and detrimental to 
social welfare. (Social/digital) Media platforms are usually artificial platforms; the advertising 
revenue model represents only one out of several possible organization options. 
 
3.2 Sharing Economy 
Introduction 
The sharing economy enjoys growing popularity, not only amongst its users but also in the 
scientific discourse (for a detailed overview and further information see Dittmann & Kuchinke 
2017).16 On the one hand, it is described as an innovative, resource-saving and welfare in-
creasing way of organizing the economy (Zobrist & Grammp 2015: 4; Rauch & Schleicher 
2015: 11; Koopman et al. 2014: 5, 2015: 2; Demary 2015: 7), on the other hand some con-
cerns arise regarding market conduct and the regulation of sharing enterprises. It is argued 
that there are no market conduct rules for these enterprises, as existing rules of traditional 
markets cannot easily be adapted to the sharing economy and governments have not re-
sponded to the growing importance of these companies so far by creating fitting laws 




                                                 
16 Since we discuss the sharing economy, we focus on commercial, i.e. paid-for, sharing in contrast to non-
economic, private sharing without any payment by the user. Note that non-for-profit sharing, i.e. a price 
covering costs but not yielding profits, represents an economic activity. 
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Literature and Status Quo 
A universal definition of the sharing economy could not prevail so far. Basically, the term 
sharing economy describes a particular way of exchanging products or services through a 
web-based platform (Koopman et al. 2015: 2; Bond 2015: 77; Hamari et al. 2015; Fraiberger 
& Sundararajan 2015: 5; Cusumano 2015: 32). Thereby, peer-to-peer sharing and so-called 
asset hubs have to be distinguished. In the case of peer-to-peer sharing (like Uber or AirBnB), 
the sharing company acts as an intermediary between buyers and sellers of certain goods.17 
The transaction itself takes place exclusively between the suppliers and buyers, whereas the 
platform limits its activities to the mediation between both sides of the market. While the 
platform represents the sharing company, the exchange of services is usually concluded be-
tween private individuals. Already existing resources are exchanged (“shared”), so that no 
new resources are claimed. Instead, the existing ones are led to better utilization, which can 
result in decreasing fixed costs (DuPuis & Rainwater 2015: 2; Zobrist & Grammp 2015: 4; 
Schor 2014: 3). In contrast to the peer-to-peer sharing, asset hubs (like car rental or 
DriveNow) offer their own resources for use and, thus, act as a traditional supplier of goods. 
As asset hubs show no considerable differences to standard economic relations, they are 
excluded from the following analysis.  
A number of special features are assigned to the sharing economy, which are also viewed to 
be its main economic advantages. Some authors emphasize that the sharing economy leads 
to a significant reduction of information asymmetries (see section 2.3) between buyers and 
sellers of goods through providing access to online evaluations by other users in forums, 
social networks or own review sites. Hence, both sides of the market may inform themselves 
extensively about the characteristics of the opposite market side. The facilitated access to 
relevant information leads to a decline of search and information costs and, therefore, ulti-
mately to a significant reduction of transaction costs. Falling transaction costs, in turn, allow 
for the supply and demand of any small quantities, resulting in the so-called disaggregation 
of the offer. Thus, the sharing economy may be able to better adapt to the individual needs 
and preferences of consumers than conventional transactions. At the same time, the possi-
bility to split supply into arbitrarily small amounts as well as the use of temporarily unused 
assets or skills could cause a better utilization of existing resources. According to this argu-
mentation, the sharing economy could contribute to the reduction or even the overcoming 
of the scarcity problem and increase social welfare. The described higher degree of flexibility 
                                                 
17 Note that it constitutes a commercial transaction if you temporarily allow an individual to use a good belong-
ing to you in exchange for some monetary recoupment. Renting you flat out on AirBnB or giving someone a 
paid-for ride via Uber represent commercial transactions where a service is supplied by one individual and 
consumed by another. 
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also extends to the pricing of goods (Skift Report 2013: 22; Rauch & Schleicher 2015: 17). 
Sharing companies may adjust both the type of offered services as well as the prices better 
to the individual users’ needs and preferences.  
Sharing companies often compete with traditional companies in the same or related mar-
kets, for instance Uber with traditional taxi services or AirBnB with the traditional hotel in-
dustry. This has raised concerns about violations of existing regulations in these markets by 
sharing companies and an unfair advantage of sharing companies over existing businesses, 
perhaps even threatening their commercial existence. Due to the different business model, 
it is sometimes controversial whether sharing companies must follow ‘old’ industry regula-
tions whereas, at the same time, there are no special market conduct rules for the sharing 
economy so far. Since the ‘old’ industry regulations often appear inadequate for the nature 
of sharing businesses or could even sometimes threaten the underlying business model, 
some authors welcome the resulting regulatory freedom and claim that the sharing economy 
could regulate itself (Horney 2015: 3). Other authors, however, see a number of problems 
from regulatory freedom, in particular regarding issues of safety, accountability, and respon-
sibility as well as liability for taxation. 
The problem of different regulation of traditional and sharing companies created many legal 
and political controversies. For instance, the market entry of the US driving service Uber led 
to massive resistance from traditional taxi service companies. As in several other countries, 
the German courts responded with a general prohibition of UberPOP. An authorization 
would not be applicable, neither as a taxi or as car rental company nor could specific para-
graphs be applied as exception rule on Uber, as the US driving service would not meet the 
necessary requirements for that, offering a free or cost-covering transport. Taxi services are 
still considered as an element of general interest and as an "outstanding important common 
good" by the Constitutional Court. A provision by other modes of transport is being rejected. 
New features like Ubers’ would present a risk for the functioning of German taxi services 
markets. In Spain, the Netherlands, Indonesia and Thailand, Uber was banned in 2014, 
France followed in 2015. In New York City, there are efforts to limit the annual growth by 
law to 1 per cent p. a. In addition, the effects of Uber’s activities on the environment and 
(local) public transport sector ought to be monitored. However, attempts to specify a regu-
latory framework tailor-made to the nature of sharing businesses have failed to appear so 
far. With the exception of the growth restriction in New York City, legislators have shown 




Sharing Economy and Platform Economics 
When considering the above description of the sharing economy, the proximity to platform 
economics (see section 3.1) becomes immediately clear. Let us have a look on Uber and 
AirBnB as sharing platforms in comparison to the taxi service app myTaxi and the hotel-
booking service HRS as more traditional platforms. Both Uber and AirBnB show the typical 
characteristics of price setting behavior that fit the description of behavior in platform eco-
nomics: the demand group possessing the lower indirect network effect must pay a higher 
price than the demand group exerting a higher indirect network effect. Thus, no particular 
distinctions of sharing platforms to other (digital) platforms can be seen. However, what 
about the other special characteristics and advantages referred to in the literature? 
The reduction of information asymmetries represents a key feature of the sharing economy. 
On closer inspection, however, its case is not so clear. Using different review sites, social 
networks and forums to gather pre-transaction information is not limited to users in the 
context of the sharing economy but open to all customers for any kind of product or service. 
The scope of the available information is determined by the willingness of individuals to 
share their experiences (with suppliers or other users, their products, prices and quality in 
the internet) with others, and not by the nature of the subsequent transaction (i.e. a ‘sharing’ 
transaction via Uber or a ‘traditional’ transaction via Amazon). Individuals could, for exam-
ple, collect information about a particular good on the internet and then purchase it offline 
in a traditional store. Hence, this cannot be seen as constituting characteristic of sharing 
economy. The potential for reducing information asymmetries is rather the result of an in-
creasing distribution and use of the internet as well as an increasing exchange of information 
about personal experiences on the internet. Therefore, it is difficult to see how sharing trans-
actions generate an information advantage compared to other transactions, in particular 
other transactions involving online platforms. Similarly, the accompanying reasoning that 
the sharing economy lowers transactions costs cannot be supported as well; again, it is more 
an effect of digitization in general. 
A critical view on the earlier described disaggregation of offers and, hence, the resulting 
supply flexibility reveals doubts to whether the sharing economy necessarily allows for 
smaller and, therefore, more individual quantities of goods than other (digital) platforms, 
traditional brick-and-mortar stores or the traditional service sector. For instance, rides in taxis 
serve as transportation from an individual starting point to an individual destination just like 
Uber, nights in a hotel or a holiday flat do not systematically differ from booking nights via 
AirBnB, many food and daily products can be bought in virtually all quantities, and garments 
can be rented from theaters. These anecdotal counter-examples do disprove cases, in which 
 24 
the level of aggregation in the sharing economy actually is lower. However, they demon-
strate that disaggregation and supply flexibility do not represent an exclusive, distinctive 
feature of sharing arrangements.  
Now, what about pricing flexibility? Most of the currently prominent sharing companies 
entered markets that are characterized by a high level of public regulation, like for example 
Uber and AirBnB. Taxi service markets are, inter alia, regulated in terms of payments and 
safety standards. Likewise, hotels and similar services face numerous regulatory standards. 
So far, neither Uber nor AirBnB meet comparable specifications – or ‘just’ pay taxes to a 
comparable extent. Therefore, higher pricing flexibility is indeed not surprising given the 
significant lower costs due to the non-compliance with regulation. Thus, higher pricing flex-
ibility is not a characteristic of the sharing economy but rather a result of the ignorance of 
existing regulations. 
Eventually, what can we conclude about the ecological advantages of the sharing economy 
due to a better utilization of otherwise unused resources and overall lower consumption-
levels of resources?  For a closer look on this blanket argument, we need to distinguish 
goods, which are no longer used, from the ones that are only not being used temporarily. If 
a good is no longer required, it does not make a difference for its utilization whether it is 
leased to other individuals via the sharing economy or sold on eBay, Amazon or a flea mar-
ket. Here, also no fundamental characteristic of the sharing economy surfaces. In contrast, 
the utilization of temporarily unused resources may well increase if, for instance, a private 
car is used as an Uber vehicle. However, with more intensive utilization the wear regarding 
the vehicle is also increasing, so that the product life cycle is reduced and it has to be replaced 
earlier. The short-run resource conservation may, therefore, be offset in the medium- to long-
run depending on the characteristics of the goods. The total environmental effects are not 
evident. 
In summary, the essential difference between the sharing economy and more traditional 
business is the degree of price flexibility. However, this does not result from the nature of 
the sharing economy but from a mismatch of sharing business models with ‘old-fashioned’ 
industry regulation (Dittmann & Kuchinke 2017). Next to representing an example of plat-
form economics in many regards, the sharing economy also commercializes the use of per-




3.3 Economics of (Big) Data, Privacy, and Online Communication 
Introduction 
The phenomenon that some services and contents, especially via the internet, are offered 
ostensibly “for free” (in terms of a monetary price in common currency) is receiving increas-
ing attention in the economics of industrial organization. In particular online communication 
services like social media networking (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, Instagram), messenger services 
(like WhatsApp) or online telephone and videophone services (e.g. Skype) but also searching 
services (e.g. Google, Bing), (price) comparison services (e.g. Nextag, PriceGrabber) or book-
ing services (e.g. Booking.com, HRS) can be used by everyone for the monetary price of zero. 
The same is true for various contents (e.g. YouTube, news platforms, smartphone apps, etc.). 
While platform economics already offers a theory explaining zero prices towards one de-
mand side (users), subsidized by the other demand side (advertisers) (see section 3.1), the 
context of big data analytics and privacy concerns has recently revived an older discussion 
from economics dealing with the incentives to provide personalized data and the effects of 
its usage for commercial purposes.  
Personalized data includes both (i) “classic” registration data like email addresses, names, 
sex, age, perhaps residence information, maybe even account/payment information and (ii) 
“advanced” behavioural data that allows for conclusions and conjectures regarding the pref-
erences and the commercial behaviour of consumers. This advanced data may consist of 
personalized data about individual (online) browsing, searching and buying histories (re-
vealed preference data) as well as preference-related statements of users through posts, 
comments, ratings, (Facebook-)“likes”, etc. (stated preference data). Additionally, individual 
movement profiles, collected through the location function of mobile devices, and other 
personalized data may complement the information. Pooling such data yields more or less 
accurate individual consumption patterns, from which reasonable hypothesis about individ-
ual consumer preferences may be derived.  
The older literature from the 20th century focused on asymmetric information effects, i.e. 
one market side enjoys better information about personal data than the other side (see sec-
tion 2.3): situations in which consumers behave (hyper-) rational and smart, whereas service 
providers suffer from information disadvantages (inter alia, Hirshleifer 1971, 1980; Stigler 
1980; Posner 1981; Varian 1997; overview: Acquisti et al. 2016). In this Stigler-Posner-Varian 
(SPV) world, an enhanced use of personalized data increases efficiency and welfare because 
information asymmetries are reduced and strategic behavior of the consumers at the ex-
pense of service providers frustrated. At the same time, data-based abuse of market power 
is rather unlikely. Consequently, this literature focuses on setting incentives for consumers 
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to reveal more personalized data (Posner 1981) as long as this increased information provi-
sion is not predominantly waste (Hirshleifer 1980; Akerlof 1976). 
Data-driven Markets 
In the light of the digital economy, however, new insights surfaced. The focus of the litera-
ture gradually shifted towards when, how, by whom and for what commercial purposes 
companies use personalized data of consumers as well as towards the commercial value of 
this data (inter alia, Taylor 2004; Acquisti & Varian 2005; Gross & Acquisti 2005; Hermalin & 
Katz 2006; Hui & Png 2006; Grossklags & Acquisti 2007; Beresford et al. 2012; Brown 2016; 
Heidhues et al. 2016; Hoffmann et al. 2016; Kerber 2016; Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch 2016; 
Heidhues & Köszegi 2017). As a consequence, information asymmetries are often reversed 
compared to the SPV world and consumers frequently find it to behave fully rational. Along 
with the growing popularity of behavioural economics approaches in industrial organization, 
empirically well-supported phenomena like (i) non-utilization of available information, (ii) 
framing and anchoring effects, loss aversion, salience as well as satisficing behaviour, and 
(iii) the presence of naïve consumers (i.e. consumers who do not correctly anticipate the 
economic interrelationships of their actions and decisions and, consequently, act overly 
trustful; Heidhues & Köszegi 2017) are increasingly targeted. Put somewhat simplifying, if 
consumers behave “only” bounded-rational and/or naïve, whereas service providers enjoy 
information advantages about the use and value of personalized data (information asym-
metries in favour of the service providers), then effects are likely to differ from the SPV world. 
In this behavioural-economics world, considerable scope for databased profits at the ex-
pense of consumer welfare surfaces, in particular in combination with market power. 
We distinguish three fundamental types of databased markets: 
(1) paying with data markets where personalized data serves as payment or cur-
rency, 
(2) data trading markets where (bundles of) personalized data are the object of 
transactions, and  
(3) markets for data extraction and protection technologies where the develop-
ment of more sophisticated extraction and analysis software (fuelled by de-
mand from data-selecting and -using companies) competes with the develop-
ment of advanced blocking software (fuelled by demand from data-protect-
ing consumers as well as collected data-protecting companies). 
The latter market type (3) is particularly relevant for the extent of asymmetric information 
and the asymmetry of power in databased markets. Sophisticated extraction technologies 
may collect data without the awareness of the consumer. Already now, many internet users 
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are unaware of the number of cookies (tracking programs installed on your computer when 
visiting websites) regularly tracking their internet surfing behavior and the extent of data 
collected this way – not to speak about the subsequent commercial use of this data. More-
over, the German Facebook antitrust case reveals that personalized data may be collected 
by a company even if the user does not visit the website or uses the service: already visiting 
a site with a Facebook interface (e.g. a like-button) is allegedly sufficient for the social media 
operator to track the data (Budzinski & Grusevaja 2018). Blocking technologies (ad-blockers 
being a simple example), on the other hand, empower the user to keep control of her per-
sonalized data. If the “race” between extraction and protection technologies is head-to-
head, then this promotes efficiency and welfare (Acquisti & Varian 2005). However, if extrac-
tion technologies, due to the financial power of the big online companies, out-develop com-
bating protection technologies due to unorganized or bounded-rationally ignorant users, 
then negative consumer welfare effects must be expected. Protection software shielding 
companies collected stock of data against digital thieves and pirates represents a different 
branch of this market. 
If bundles of personalized data possess commercial value, then markets where these data 
bundles are traded (type 2) promote an efficient allocation (Varian 1997; Acquisti & Varian 
2005). However, one problem refers to the knowledge of the original provider of the data: 
does she stand a chance to anticipate the further use of her data if it gets bundled and sold 
by the original data collector? If not, inefficiencies and privacy concerns may arise (Varian 
1997; Acquisti & Varian 2005). Another problem relates to the value of big data. It is not so 
much the data itself that promises commercial value; instead the tools and competencies to 
meaningfully pool, combine, and analyze the data so that commercially valuable conclusions 
can be drawn represent the scarce resource (Schwalbe 2018). 
Databased Business Models 
Internet users are mostly confronted with type (1) of databased markets where they “pay” 
for a good (service, content) by providing their personal data either instead of having to 
offer traditional money (i.e. monetary price of zero) or receiving a (implicit, tacit) monetary 
price discount. The industrial organization literature asks both why are these business mod-
els profitable for companies (relinquishing revenue; they could have sold this service or con-
tent) and what are the consumer welfare effects? Presently, three databased business mod-
els are particularly discussed: 
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(i) Targeted advertising describes the case where personalized data about the user, 
especially advanced behavioral data, serves to personalize advertising according 
to the databased-conjectured preferences of the user. This is the phenomenon 
that platform economics are explaining (see section 3.1). Users consuming the 
zero-priced services and contents pay with their attention and get confronted 
with more or less sophisticated advertisings. Target advertising further improves 
profitability of managing the INE because if users receive advertising about goods 
they – according to the collected personalized data – like, then the probability of 
a successful advertisement should be increased and the annoyance factor of the 
advertising (the negative INE on the user) should be decreased. Since databased 
targeted advertising is more effective, advertisers are willing to pay more for it 
and profits of the platform increase. However, the effects on consumer welfare 
are ambivalent. On the one hand, targeted advertising should be less disturbing 
than ‘ordinary’ advertising (Acquisti & Varian 2005; Tucker 2012). On the other 
hand, however, the amount and intrusive character of advertising may increase, 
advertising avoidance costs rise, and privacy concerns surface (Hui & Png 2006; 
Anderson & de Palma 2012; Tucker 2012). 
(ii) Based upon personalized data, companies individualize services, tailor-made to 
the individual user, which are either a good in itself or a means to facilitate the 
buying of other goods (i.e. reducing transaction costs). Examples include data-
based search services, which provide a ranking of results that fit the preferences 
of the individual user (e.g. Google Search), as well as databased recommendation 
services that suggest other goods based upon the consumption history of the 
individual user and other users (e.g. Amazon, YouTube, Netflix, Spotify, etc.). 
These individualized services induce additional consumption and, thus, increasing 
turnover and revenues – and are often an important element of their suppliers’ 
commercial success. At the same time, shaping digital goods according to the 
preferences of the consumers should typically also increase consumer welfare (Ac-
quisti & Varian 2005). 
(iii) Very sophisticated personalized data analysis (e.g. pooling individual search and 
consumption patterns with personal preference statements) may allow compa-
nies to approximate the individual willingness-to-pay of users for a given good, 
so that they may charge different consumers different prices for the same product 
or service (databased price discrimination). In theory, such individualized prices 
could come close to first-degree price discrimination. However, firstly, the quality 
and the quantity of the data need to be excellent enough to allow for sufficiently 
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precise approximations. Secondly, market transparency reduces the scope for da-
tabased price discrimination (for instance, online easily available – and unbiased 
– price comparison services). Thirdly, effective competition probably erodes high 
margins from price discrimination.18 In a SPV-world, databased price discrimina-
tion may have welfare-increasing effects due to efficiency gains and an expansion 
of quantities. Notwithstanding, consumers’ rents will obviously be transferred 
into producers’ rents when companies can price each consumer at the maximal 
price this consumer is willing to pay (distribution effect). In a BE-world, negative 
consumer welfare effects are likely to more prevalent, in particular in combination 
with heterogeneous goods (i.e. product/service differentiation or even individual-
ization), lock-in effects and switching barriers, relevant information asymmetries 
at the expense of consumers (Taylor 2004; Hermalin & Katz 2006), information 
deficiencies about how personal data is used (Acquisti & Varian 2005), low com-
petition intensity, i.e. a lack of alternatives for consumers (Kerber 2016), as well 
as the presence of naïve and/or bounded-rational users (Hoffmann et al. 2016; 
Heidhues & Köszegi 2017). Furthermore, negative dynamic effects may occur, for 
instance the survival of inferior goods in the market (Heidhues et al. 2016). 
Modern online media markets often display the characteristics of the BE-world rather than 
the SPV-world. Online communication markets serve as a prime example. Communicating 
online can take place, for instance, via emails, messenger services, direct audio and video 
connections, or social media. Many of these services require the user to sign in to a network 
or a platform, like, for instance, the popular Facebook services (including its subsidiaries 
WhatsApp and Instagram). Users need to agree with the terms and conditions of usage, 
including privacy rules. In a SPV-world, we assume that potential users utilize the available 
information about terms, conditions, and privacy and then make an informed and rational 
decision whether to join the network and/or download the application. However, empirical 
analyses demonstrate that users tend to ignore the available information due to its sheer 
length and information overload problems, due to complicated language (often because of 
legal requirements) and due to the feeling that they have no choice anyway (Gross & Acquisti 
2005; Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch 2016). At the same time, many users do actually care about 
privacy and state privacy-related objections to far-reaching data usage terms and conditions 
                                                 
18 While such sophisticated databased price discrimination systems do not appear widespread nowadays (which 
may change in the future, though), more rudimental versions exist where prices are adjusted according to 
more general information about platform-specific search histories, location and time of buying, type of com-
puter device used, etc. often combined with dynamic pricing elements (e.g. online airline ticket sale plat-
forms). Amazon temporarily test-tried a databased price discrimination system in the U.S. See Budzinski & 
Köhler (2015). 
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when asked in surveys or interviews. This phenomenon – a conflict between revealed pref-
erences and stated preferences – is usually called the privacy paradox (inter alia, Grossklags 
& Acquisti 2007; Beresford et al. 2012). Its widespread existence points towards a BE-world 
being the more appropriate framework for analyzing online communication.  
 
4 Implications for Competition Policy and Regulation 
The policy implications of industrial organization theory relate to competition policy and 
sector-specific regulation. Competition policy, on the one hand, applies a framework of com-
petition rules with the aim of protecting competitive markets from inner erosion and pre-
serving the welfare effects of the process of competition (see section 2.2; for detailed over-
views on competition policy see Motta 2004; Blair & Sokol 2015). The competitive market 
process may be inherently eroded by collusive arrangements among competitors, i.e. when 
companies cooperate on dimensions of competition like prices, quantities, market division, 
innovation, etc. at the detriment of consumers and society. Cartels refer to contractual col-
lusion, tacit collusion or coordinated effects to non-contractual collusion. Another way of 
eroding competitive forces may be an increasing concentration creating market power for 
dominant companies (up to (quasi-)monopolies). While dominance cannot be completely 
prevented (see section 2.2), merger control seeks to limit anticompetitive concentration 
through merging with or acquiring other companies. Companies that nevertheless enjoy 
market powerful positions (perhaps because of past breakthrough innovation), irrespective 
of how they came into these positions, are not allowed to abuse this dominant position at 
the detriment of consumers, society, and sometimes also smaller competitors. Although the 
competition rules differ in detail from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, anti-cartel policy, merger 
control, and abuse control are nowadays the common three pillars of virtually all competi-
tion policies around the world, existing in more than 100 countries worldwide (Budzinski 
2015). Sector-specific regulation, on the other hand, aims to correct market failure (see sec-
tion 2.3), but is often also driven by influences from lobbyism and political failures. Thus, its 
economic effects are often controversial and, in many cases, deficient regulation actually 
reduces welfare.  
Traditionally, media industries were heavily regulated in many countries. Telecommunica-
tions and postal services represent a typical case where comprehensive regulation or even 
governmental organization of the sector used to be prevalent. The natural monopoly of 
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physical cable nets serves as economic justification for governmental interrogation and reg-
ulation (see section 2.3).19 However, technological progress like mobile telephony virtually 
eroded most of the natural monopoly character and, consequently, also most of the eco-
nomic justification for sector-specific regulations. Notwithstanding, elements of natural mo-
nopolies may still exist if, for instance, broadband internet access is only possible through 
access to a physical fiber-optic cable net.  
Another area of sector-specific media regulation in many countries is broadcasting services 
like television and radio. Typically, the motivation starkly differs in this case: some countries 
regulate broadcasting media in order to protect and preserve the freedom and diversity of 
opinion, other countries rather for the opposite reasons. Thus, public service broadcasters 
may either be comparatively independent cornerstones of a free and diverse media system 
or biased advocates of the government – in the first case protected in its existence by regu-
lation, in the second case protected from competition by regulation. From an economic per-
spective, the problem of asymmetric information combined with elements of credence good 
character of news may justify some regulation although modern research on the (industrial) 
economics of media bias point to competition as a more effective instrument to limit bias, 
favoring a strict competition policy over sector-specific regulation. 
Like virtually all other industries, media industries are subject to competition law and policy. 
While cartels and collusive arrangements do not have a prominent case record in media 
industries (with some exceptions), merger control plays an important role. Several media 
industries like telecommunications or the music industry experienced considerable concen-
tration tendencies on an international scale. In the latter case, for instance, the market struc-
ture of record companies halved from formerly six majors some 20 years ago (Universal, 
Sony, Warner, EMI, BMG, PolyGram) down to three (Universal, Sony BMG, Warner) today. In 
the markets for social networks and online messenger services, the 2014 acquisition of 
WhatsApp by Facebook was cleared by competition authorities in Europe and the U.S., a 
decision that received scholarly criticism because of a lack of adequate application of the 
economics of personalized data (see section 3.3) by the competition authorities (Deutscher 
2017; Budzinski & Stöhr 2018). In 2018, U.S. antitrust authorities tried to block the merger 
between telecommunications giant AT&T and leading media content company Time Warner 
due to severe anticompetitive concerns, however, failed to convince the law courts of the 
first instance – a judgment whose reasoning receiving critical reviews from an industrial or-
                                                 
19 Note that the historical reasons for regulated or state-organized postal and telecommunication services were 
often politico-military rather than economic. 
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ganization perspective (Caffarra et al. 2018; Salop 2018). The German competition authori-
ties, on the other hand, successfully blocked both a merger between leading newspaper 
publisher Springer and commercial television provider ProSiebenSat.1 in (Budzinski & Wacker 
2007; Kuchinke & Schubert 2006) as well as a cooperative VoD platform by leading commer-
cial TV stations in the 2000s (Budzinski & Lindstädt-Dreusicke 2018). 
With the upcoming relevance of digital and online media platforms, abuse control gained 
importance in media competition policy, in particular because platforms tend towards pow-
erful market positions due to network effects (see section 3.1) but also because of the often 
global business of these platforms. Already in the 1990s and early 2000s, competition au-
thorities around the world targeted a number of Microsoft’s business practices abusing the 
market power from their then dominating operating system including practices like raising 
rivals’ costs, foreclosure, bundling and tying, exclusive contracts, etc. (Fisher & Rubinfeld 
2001; Gilbert & Katz 2001). Some of the charges against Google regarding its Android busi-
ness practices resemble this case (Vezzoso 2018). However, with its dominating search en-
gine, Google additionally faces allegations regarding search bias, i.e. deliberately manipulat-
ing its search algorithm to benefit its own subsidiary services at the expense of competitors 
and consumers, as well as regarding abusive practices in online advertising (European Com-
mission 2017, 2018). European competition authorities sentenced a € 2.42 billion fine in the 
search bias case. Also, the market power and related business strategies of companies like 
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Spotify and others receive increasing attention by competition 
authorities. 
All these cases demonstrate the relevance of up-to-date industrial economics knowledge 
about modern media industries because both competition policy enforcement and sound 
regulation needs to be rooted in comprehensive economic analysis. Digitization and the in-
ternet have considerably changed the business world and fuelled concentration trends and 
the emergence of powerful international market positions by single companies. These devel-
opments promote a discussion whether competition policy suffices to control modern media 
industries or whether there is a need for adapted competition rules or even new regulation. 
While we think that adapted competition rules and reinvigorated antitrust policies should 
suffice to enforce procompetitive behavior by platforms and data-driven businesses in the 
online world (Budzinski & Stöhr 2018), we emphasize the necessity of regulatory changes to 
accommodate a fair, level-playing field competition of sharing economy companies with 
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